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UNITED STATES V. KIMBELL FOODS, INC.: A
PROBLEM OR SOLUTION IN RESOLVING LIEN
PRIORITY DISPUTES?
The recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc.' and United States v. Crittenden represent the Court's first
examination of the choateness doctrine in over a decade.3 The Court's
holding, that the relative priority of private liens and consensual liens
arising pursuant to government lending programs is to be determined
"under non-discriminatory state laws"4 raises more questions than it an-
swers, and sets the stage for further judicial and legislative reform in a
particularly chaotic area of the law.' Clearly, the Court's opinion calls into
question the continuing viability of the choateness doctrine, which the
Court itself introduced fifty years ago.
6
The choateness doctrine was formulated by the Supreme Court to re-
solve priority conflicts between competing federal and non-federal liens.
7
Under the choateness doctrine, a non-federal lien's priority is measured
from the time the lien becomes definite in at least three respects. The
identity of the lienor, the property to which the lien attaches, and the
1 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1979), aff'g sub nom. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557
F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977).
2 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1979) (vacating and remanding 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977)).
See, e.g., United States v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1966)
(mortgage foreclosure proceeding involving recorded federal tax lien and an inchoate state
mortgage lien); United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 355 (1964) (antecedent state tax lien
upon property of solvent taxpayer held choate for purposes of priority over subsequent federal
tax lien); United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 87-92 (1963) (claim for attorneys'
fees remained inchoate until finally fixed in amount in mortgage foreclosure decree entered
subsequent to filing of unpaid federal tax liens; thus, claim for attorneys' fees held subordi-
nate to federal tax liens even though federal tax liens were filed after claim for attorneys' fees
had become enforceable at state law).
99 S. Ct. at 1465.
See text accompanying note 148 infra. As a result of the Kimbell decision, the Supreme
Court vacated Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217 (1st Cir. 1978),
for further consideration. Hercoform, Inc. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 99 S. Ct. 1987 (1979). See
note 63 infra.
6 The inception of the choateness doctrine can be traced to County of Spokane, Washing-
ton v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929); see notes 20-21 infra.
See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra. See generally Kennedy, From Spokane
County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien,
50 IowA L. REv. 724 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy]; Kennedy, The Relative Priority
of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Ymz
L.J. 905, 911-19 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Relative Priority]; MacLachlan, Improving the
Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REv. 73 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as MacLachan]; Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade,
77 YALE L.J. 228 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Plumb]; Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and
Lien Problems, 13 TAx. L. REv. 459 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Federal Tax Collection];
Wolson, Federal Tax Liens-A Study in Confusion and Confiscation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 180
(1959).
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amount of the lien must be ascertained in order for a nonfederal lien to be
"choate" and thus perfected against subsequently arising federal liens.,
The choateness doctrine, however, was not the first solution for resolv-
ing priority conflicts between competing claims. Congressional enactments
granting priority to claims due the federal government originated in the
late eighteenth century.' The federal tax lien dates from the conclusion of
the Civil War. ° The original federal tax lien was a secret lien which pre-
vailed over even subsequent bona fide purchasers." Since 1913, however,
Congress has enacted legislation protecting certain purchasers, mortga-
gees, judgment lien creditors, and pledgees against federal tax liens which
have not been filed for purposes of public notice.1
2
When a debtor is unlikely to have sufficient funds to satisfy all his
creditors' claims, the device for ensuring governmental priority in an insol-
vency proceeding is the federal priority statute, Revised Statute section
3466.11 Section 3466 grants first priority to the federal government but does
not operate as a lien." Whereas a lien is a charge, security, or encumbrance
upon specific property,1" section 3466 merely provides that the federal gov-
ernment's claims will be satisfied first whenever any person indebted to
the United States is insolvent or involved in one of several liquidation
I United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954); Illinois ex rel. Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946); see note 39 infra.
' See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1797, Ch. 20, § 5, I stat. 515; Act of July 31, 1789, Ch. 5 § 21, 1
stat. 42. See also Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security
Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Coogan]; Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 907-11.
,0 Act of March 3, 1865, Ch. 78, 13 Stat. 470.
" United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 213-15 (1893). See also Plumb, supra note 7,
at 228 n.2, 229; Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 920-21. The original federal tax lien was a
"secret" lien because there was no requirement that notice of its existence be filed. Plumb,
supra note 7, at 228 n.2.
12 Act of March 4, 1913, Ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016; Revenue Act of 1939, § 401, 53 Stat. 882.
Because searching for federal tax liens is impractical for purchasers of securities and motor
vehicles, Congress has provided priority for such purchasers over even existing federal tax
liens. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(2). For other purchasers prior to the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act,
however, the federal tax lien remained effective against the taxpayer and all other creditors.
Public notice was unnecessary. See Plumb, supra note 7, at 229. See also Relative Priority,
supra note 7, at 920-22.
13 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). Section 3466 provides:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is
insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United
States shall be satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases
in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a
voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding,
concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an
act of bankruptcy is committed.
" United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 254 (1923); United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 73 (1805). See Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 9907-08.
11 D. EPsTEn & V. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDrrORS 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
EPSTEIN & LANDERS].
KIMBELL FOODS
procedures, including probate, attachment, or assignment for the benefit
of creditors.
Initially, federal priority pursuant to section 3466 was valid only
against unsecured creditors." Section 3466 did not interfere with pre-
existing liens.' County of Spokane, Washington v. United States' her-
alded a significant departure from the established interpretation of section
3466 and introduced the choateness doctrine into federal common law.'"
The Supreme Court held that a federal tax claim is superior to an antedat-
ing local lien which is neither specific nor perfected in accordance with
state law.2 ' Hence, the federal priority statute, section 3466, was employed
in an insolvency proceeding to defeat a local tax lien.2
The requirement that local liens be specific and perfected was subse-
quently expanded in United States v. Waddill, Holland and Flinn, Inc.z2
The issue in Waddill was whether in a state proceeding under a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors, section 3466 gave priority over a
landlord's lien and a municipal tax lien." The landlord argued that federal
"1 See note 13 supra. See also McLachlan, supra note 7, at 76-77; Relative Priority, supra
note 7, at 909-11.
'1 Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 929. Professor Kennedy argued that § 3466 probably
was enacted solely for purposes of reaching unencumbered property of the insolvent debtor.
He insisted that Congress did not intend that priority payments should be made from prop-
erty already subject to a mortgage or other lien. Indeed, in several nineteenth century cases,
the Supreme Court refused to grant federal priority over antecedent liens. Id. at 907-08. See
Brent v. Bank of Wash., 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 262 (1836); United States v. Hack, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
96 (1834); Conard v. Pacific Ins. Co., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 110 (1832); Conard v. Nicoll, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 74 (1830); Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 25 U.S. (1 Pet.) 637 (1828); United States v.
Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805).
11 Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 908 n.16, 908-09, citing Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co.,
25 U.S. (1 Pet.) 637, 651 (1828) [no previous Supreme Court decision has established a
proposition that "a specific and perfected lien can be displaced by the mere priority of the
United States"].
" 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
20 Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 908-11. The Supreme Court in Spokane County held
that pursuant to § 3466, taxes owed the federal government by an insolvent debtor enjoyed
priority over county taxes assessed on personal property of the taxpayer prior to appointment
of a receiver. 279 U.S. at 93-95. The Court stressed that the county tax assessment was not
supported by a specific lien under state law, because the property subject to the lien had not
been seized by the sheriff nor had "any . . .necessary procedure mentioned in the statute
. . ." been initiated to secure the property. Id. at 94. An unperfected or unspecific lien is
"inchoate." See United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323,327-28 (1966).
21 279 U.S. at 93-95. See note 20 supra. In order for a lien to be specific and perfected,
there usually must be a public filing, such as for consensual liens and many statutory liens,
or there must be an actual seizure of the property, such as for judicial liens. See Epstein &
Landers, supra note 16, at 2. See generally Illi, Inc. v. Margolis, 267 Md. 80, 296 A.2d 412
(1972); Cannon Mills, Inc. v. Spivey, 208 Tenn. 419, 346 S.W.2d 266 (1961).
22 279 U.S. at 93-95. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 725; Relative Priority, supra note 7,
at 809-19, 929, MacLachlan, supra note 7, at 77-78; 3 RuTGEs-CAMFnN L. REV. 592, 595-96
n.25 (1972).
- 323 U.S. 352 (1945).
14 Id. at 356-57.
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priority pursuant to section 3466 would be defeated by a specific and
perfected lien upon the property prior to the insolvency or voluntary as-
signment." The Supreme Court, however, held that state law notwith-
standing, federal law determines whether a lien arising as a result of a
particular state statute is sufficiently choate to rise above federal claims. 6
Consequently, the courts were no longer bound by the individual states'
perfection requirements.Y
Shortly thereafter in United States v. Security Trust and Savings
Bank, 2 the Supreme Court extended the choateness doctrine to grant fed-
eral tax liens superiority over antedating inchoate liens.29 The Court held
that a federal tax lien was superior to a local attachment lien where the
tax lien was recorded after the attachment lien but before the attaching
creditor obtained a judgment. 0 The Security Trust decision was clearly
contrary to thirty lower court decisions which denied the supremacy of
federal tax liens over antedating rival claims without any discussion of
choateness.11
Confusion with regard to the correct application of the choateness doc-
trine was further exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. City of New Britain." The Court in New Britain held that ante-
dating state tax liens did not rise above a federal tax lien, because the state
tax liens had not ripened into a judgment at the time the federal lien
attached, and thus the state tax liens were inchoate.3 3 The significance of
the New Britain decision stems from the fact that the Court erroneously
equated the well-established common law principle of "first in time is first
in right" with the relatively recent choateness doctrine.
3 4
Id. at 355.
26 Id. at 356-57.
2 Id.
340 U.S. 47 (1950).
29 Id. Under California law, a subsequent judgment lien merged with the attachment lien
and related back to the time when the attachment was recorded. Id. at 48-50. The federal
tax lien arose after the attachment lien, and according to California law, was subject to the
prior lien. Id. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that the federal tax lien arose before
the California creditor obtained a judgment. Id. at 50. Hence, the Court held that the attach-
ment lien was contingent and thus inchoate. Id. The government reasoned, and the Supreme
Court agreed, that since the priority of the California creditor's lien would be defeated if §
3466 were applicable, the federal tax lien should be accorded the same priority by analogy.
Id. at 50-51. Security Trust marked the first time that the Supreme Court applied the
choateness doctrine to a situation where the debtor was not insolvent. See Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1972).
" 340 U.S. at 48-51.
3' Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 924 n.115.
32 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
11 Id. at 82-88. See United States v. Ringwood Iron Mines, Inc., 251 F.2d 145, 146 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958).
11 See 347 U.S. at 85-86. The choateness doctrine and "first in time" however, are two
distinct principles. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d at 499; Texas Oil
& Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d at 1045; Plumb, supra note 7, at 230.
KIMBELL FOODS
Under the "first in time" rule, the first lien which attaches to the
property interest has priority over subsequently attaching liens, unless the
first lien is otherwise defective.5 Although the Supreme Court in New
Britain insisted that it was applying "first in time," grafting the choate-
ness doctrine onto "first in time" effectively nullified the "first in time"
rule .3 Except for certain possessory liens and certain local tax liens which
attached to the property in specific amounts and were summarily enforcea-
ble without judicial proceedings, no common law, equitable, or statutory
lien could satisfy the choateness test until the lienor's claim had been
reduced to a judgment.
3
1
A second source of confusion originating in the New Britain opinion was
the precise peramaters of the choateness doctrine. The Court expanded a
doctrine which originated in insolvency proceedings to apply to federal tax
liens.38 The Supreme Court failed to indicate whether choateness would be
extended further to protect additional federal interests.
In the late 1950's, the lower federal courts began applying the choate-
ness doctrine to give priority to federal liens in situations which did not
involve a federal tax lien or debtor insolvency.39 In the first of these deci-
sions, United States v. Ringwood Iron Mines, Inc., the Third Circuit up-
held the priority of an antedating federal mortgage lien over a lien for
unpaid real estate taxes." The court stated that the only difference be-
tween Ringwood Iron Mines and New Britain was that the former involved
the execution of a mortgage and the latter involved a tax lien.4 According
to the Third Circuit, the New Britain decision provided that the choate-
ness doctrine should be applied to protect federal liens, regardless of
whether the debtor was insolvent or the federal lien was a claim for taxes.2
31 The "first in time" rule was summarized by Chief Justice Marshall inRankin v. Scott:
[t]he principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim,
which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds, unless the lien be
intrinsically defective, or be displaced by some act of the party holding it, which
shall postpone him in a court of law or equity to a subsequent claimant.
7 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 104, 105 (1827). Thus, under the "first in time" rule, the first lien which
attaches to the property interest has priority over subsequently attaching liens, unless it is
otherwise defective. Prior to United States v. Security Trust and Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47
(1950), the lower courts had denied supremacy to federal tax liens over antedating liens based
upon the "first in time" principle without reference to choateness. Relative Priority, supra
note 7, at 924-25. In Security Trust and Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held for a nonfed-
eral lien to be "first in time," the lien must be choate. See text accompanying notes 28-30
supra. The Supreme Court employed the same analysis in United States v. City of New
Britain, 347 U.S. at 84-85.
11 Plumb, supra note 7, at 230.
31 Id. See Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d at 499. See generally
United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1964); note 51 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 20-22, 29-31 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 40-46 infra.
40 251 F.2d 145, 146-47 (3rd Cir. 1958).
" Id. See 347 U.S. at 82-85; Relative Priority, supra note 7, at 927-29.
,2 251 F.2d at 146-47.
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The cogency of the Third Circuit's analysis is questionable and under-
scores the confusion created by the New Britain opinion.13 The Third Cir-
cuit could have based its decision upon the "first in time" rule without
relying upon the choateness doctrine because the federal mortgage lien in
Ringwood Iron Mines was recorded prior to the real estate tax lien." Simi-
larly, several early circuit court applications of the choateness doctrine to
nontax federal liens beyond the purview of section 3466 involved situations
where the federal lien was prior in time to the interest of the competing
lienor and could have been resolved in accordance with "first in time,"
without reference to choateness. 5 Later decisions, however, began to apply
the choateness doctrine to grant priority to federal liens where "first in
time" would not have afforded them such priority. 6
From its inception, the choateness doctrine has been criticized severely
for the inequities resulting from the doctrine's application." The first legis-
11 Reliance on New Britain and the choateness doctrine appears unnecessary and mis-
placed. The federal mortgage lien in Ringwood Iron Mines was perfected prior to the real
estate tax lien and thus was "first in time." 251 F.2d at 146-47. The federal tax lien in New
Britain, however, arose after the local liens and could overcome the prior liens only if the local
liens were adjudged inchoate. 347 U.S. at 85.
Furthermore, New Britain was a federal tax lien case. Id. at 82. Security Trust and Savings
Bank established that the priority of the federal tax lien was based upon the government's
need "to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due to the United States ... " United
States v. Security Trust and Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950). See text accompanying notes
28-30 supra. Thus, the aplication of the choateness doctrine in New Britain was an extension
of the Security Trust and Savings Bank rationale that federal tax revenues are so vital to
the workings of government that federal tax liens require the additional protection afforded
by the choateness doctrine. 347 U.S. at 51. The rationale for protecting federal tax revenues
in Security Trust and Savings Bank and New Britain is inapplicable to Ringwood Iron Mines,
a federal mortgage lien case. 251 F.2d at 146. Neither Security Trust and Savings Bank nor
New Britain suggested that the special protection afforded federal tax liens should be ex-
tended to all federal tax liens in situations not already covered by Revised Statute § 3466.
See generally 340 U.S. at 48-51; 347 U.S. at 82-88.
" 251 F.2d at 146-47; see note 34 supra.
" See United States v. County of Iowa, 295 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1961) (state tax liens
denied priority over antedating federal mortgage, contrary state law notwithstanding);
United States v. Reessling, 280 F 2d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1960) (federal loan secured by mortgage
granted priority over subsequent state tax lien); Southwest Engine Co. v. United States, 275
F.2d 106, 107 (10th Cir. 1960) (Small Business Administration chattel mortgage granted
priority over subsequent mechanic's lien, contrary state law notwithstanding).
11 United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886, 887-88 (3rd Cir. 1965) (inchoate
local lien held subordinate to subsequently arising federal claim on judgment in mortgage
foreclosure action); In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 399-401 (3rd Cir. 1965)
(federal lien under SBA security agreement held superior to antedating inchoate state tax
liens); J.S. Purcell Lumber Corp. v. Henson, 405 F. Supp. 1130, 1132-33 (E.D. Va. 1975) (FHA
lien held superior to antedating inchoate mechanic's lien); Bellegarde Custom Kitchens v.
Select-A-Home, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 318, 319-20 (D. Me. 1974) (mortgage liens of FHA granted
priority over subsequently filed mechanic's lien, even though material and labor furnished
prior to recordation of FHA mortgage).
"7 See Report of the Special Committee on Federal Liens, 84 ABA RP. 645, 645 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Report]. Commentators emphasize that the choateness doctrine subor-
dinated statutory and contractual security interests to federal tax liens without providing
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lative attack against choateness, the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act (the Act),4"
was in response to application of the choateness doctrine to section 6321
of the Internal Revenue Code.49 Section 6321 states that an individual's
liability for taxes owed to the federal government creates a lien in favor of
the United States." Prior to the Act, only choate liens enjoyed priority over
subsequently arising federal tax liens or any federal tax lien arising pur-
suant to the debtor's insolvency. 5' The Supreme Court repeatedly awarded
priority to federal tax liens over antedating mechanic's liens,-2 real estate
affected creditors with an opportunity to protect their interests. Furthermore, advancements
made by creditors, particularly mechanics and materialmen, enhanced the value of the tax-
payer's property to the benefit of the Internal Revenue Service, which appropriated the
property to satisfy tax liens. MacLachlan, supra note 7, at 73-78; Note, Choateness and 1966
Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 MINN. L. Rxv. 198, 200-01 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Choateness
and the Act].
" I.R.C. § 6323.
, 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1976). Section 6321 provides:
[i]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax,
or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto)
shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights toproperty,
whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
Id. See generally Young, Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. Cta. L. REv. 723, 724
(1967).
1' See United States v. Security Trust and Say. Bank, 340 U.S. at 51; United States v.
Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1945); County of Spokane, Washington
v. United States, 279 U.S. at 93-95; Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d at
499. The Supreme Court defined choateness very narrowly. The exact amount of the lien, for
example, usually is not determined until the debtor has exhausted judicial procedures in
challenging the lien itself. Id. at 499 n.11, citing United States v. Gilbert Assocs., Inc., 345
U.S. 361, 365-66 (1953) (only possession or reduction to judgment by lienor can satisfy choate-
ness rule). See also United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323 (1966);
United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); 12 GA. L. REv. 692, 694 (1978).
But cf. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1964) (state tax lien which had not
been reduced to judgment held choate for purposes of prevailing over federal lien). The
precedential value of Vermont is probably limited, however, because the statutory lien in
Vermont had the force of a judgment. Id.; see Choatness and the Act, supra note 47, at 200-
01.
Finally, the impact of the choateness doctrine was alleviated, at least in part, by judicial
formulation of the "no property" rule whereby the federal tax lien could be defeated or limited
to the extent that the taxpayer had no property under state law. See Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509, 512 (1960). In Aquilino, the petitioners argued that state law created a
trust of the proceeds received by a general contractor for the benefit of unpaid contractors.
Id. at 510-13. The petitioners reasoned that while the subcontractors remained unpaid, the
contractor possessed no property interest upon which the federal lien could attach. Id. at 512-
16. The Supreme Court held that the courts must look to state law in determining whether
the contractor had a property interest to which the lien could attach. Id. at 512-13. The case
was then remanded in order that the state court could determine whether the contractor in
fact had "property." Id. at 515. See also United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522
(1960); Choateness and the Act, supra note 47, at 203 n.24.
52 See, e.g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam).
In White Bear Brewing, the mechanic had finished his work, filed his lien, and commenced
foreclosure proceedings before the federal tax lien arose and notice was filed. Id. at 1010-11.
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tax liens, 53 mortgagee's liens for fees of a foreclosing attorney,5 surety's
liens,5 landlord's liens and security interests,56 and liens of attaching credi-
tors."
Cognizant of the broad scope of section 6321 and the courts' application
of the choateness doctrine, Congress determined that certain lienors likely
to be unaware of an existant tax lien and the holders of specific property
interests merited statutory insulation against application of choateness.6
The mechanic, however, had not reduced his lien to a judgment. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the mechanic's lien was not specific and that the federal tax lien was entitled to priority.
Id. Justice Douglas observed in his dissent:
[t]he Court holds that a federal tax lien has priority over a statutory mechanic's
lien, even though the mechanic's lien was specific, prior in time, perfected in the
sense that everything possible under state law had been done to make it choate,
and was being enforced before the federal tax lien arose.
Id. at 1010. Indeed, other mechanic's liens fared equally badly in the Supreme Court during
the 1950's. See, e.g., United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958) (per curiam); United States
v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) (per curiam); United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
See also Report, supra note 47, at 651.
5' United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); see text accompanying notes 32-38
supra.
, United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958). Before Ball the choateness
doctrine had been applied only to statutory liens or liens created by garnishment or attach-
ment. In Ball, however, the Supreme Court held that a chose in action arising from the
performance of a construction contract and assigned for value to a bonding company was
subject to a federal tax lien which arose before the assignment. Id. at 588-89. The Court held
that the surety's interest was "inchoate," because the amount of the assignment had not been
determined at the time the tax lien arose. Id. at 588-90, 594. For a discussion of Ball, see
United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 89-91 (1963). See also Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1972); Report, supra note 35, at 646-47;
Salter, Priority Accorded the Sovereign in Bankruptcy: The American and BritisW Views, 63
CoM. L.J. 354, 355-56 (1958).
-" United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945). See text accom-
panying notes 23-27 supra. See generally United States v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc., 219
F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Tex. 1963); Terry v. Title & Trust Co., 207 Ore. 356, 295 P.2d 161 (1956).
See also Plumb, supra note 7, at 680-81, 681 n.499; Creedon, The Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, 20 ABA TAX SEc. BULL. 101, 101 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Creedon].
s United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955). See Creedon, supra note 56, at 101.
56 Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45- 46-47 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. See Choateness
and the Act, supra note 47, at 205-06. Interests afforded protection pursuant to the 1966 Act
include purchases of securities by bona fide purchasers; retail sales of personalty in the
ordinary course of business; automobile sales to consumers; casualty sales of personalty worth
less than $250; repairmen's possessory liens; real property taxes and assessments; certain
mechanic's liens; certain attorney's liens; insurance policy loans made by an insurance car-
rier; certain passbook loans; and real property construction or improvement loans. 26 U.S.C.
6323(b) (1976). Section 6323(a) also provides that a federal tax lien is invalid against any
purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor until
notice of the tax lien has been filed. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1976). See Plumb, supra note 7, at
232-33.
The protection afforded certain interests under § 6323(b) becomes illusory, however, if
the taxpayer becomes insolvent because insolvency proceedings are controlled by Revised
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Thus, section 6323 was passed in 1966 to grant priority to certain interests
which would not otherwise be considered "choate" by the courts." These
protected interests are generally characterized as "superpriorities. ' '61 In
situations delineated in the Act which involve superpriority interests, the
choateness doctrine is inapplicable." Although the 1966 Act restricted the
reach of the choateness doctrine as applied to federal tax liens, the in-
tended scope of this limitation remained unclear. 2 In recent years, contro-
Statute § 3466. See note 13 supra, and note 62 infra. Section 3466 grants priority to the federal
government in insolvency proceedings, regardless of the protection provided in § 6323(b). See
text accompanying notes 13-22 supra; Plumb, supra note 7, at 234, 237-39; Dennon, The
Secured Creditor and the Federal Tax Lien Act, 86 BANKING L.J. 677, 681-84
(1969)[hereinafter cited as Dennon]. For a discussion of the relationship between §§ 6323
and 3466, see Nesbitt v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 824, 828-31 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The Nesbitt
court acknowledged that the policies of fairness and equity reflected in § 6323 appear incon-
sistent with the sweeping authority of § 3466 over claims of creditors otherwise protected by
§ 6323. Id. The court concluded, however, that § 6323 does not create an implied exception
to § 3466. Id. See generally Plumb, The Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals for Reform,
70 MICH. L. REv. 3 (1971).
11 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323 (1976); Hearings, supra note 46, at 45, 47, 64. Indeed, §
6323(b) provides that certain interests which arise after the tax lien has attached and notice
of its existence has been filed nonetheless enjoy priority over the federal lien. 26 U.S.C. §
6323(b); see note 58 supra. Since the 1966 Act contains provisions, governing the tax lien's
priority with regard only to specifically delineated nonfederal property interests, several
courts have reasoned that Supreme Court decisions applying the choateness doctrine to
priority disputes between federal tax liens and nonfederal property claims remain good law
in the areas not covered by § 6323. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568
F.2d 217, 221 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978).
'" "Superpriorities" are interests that rise above already existing and filed tax liens.
Plumb, supra note 7, at 229.
See Hearings, supra note 58, at 45-47. The legislative history of the Act confirms that
the choateness doctrine was not abolished but only restricted in its application. Id.; H.R. REP.
No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966); Plumb, supra note 7, at 232-33, 245, 678-82. See
also Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1053 (5th Cir. 1972); Creedon,
supra note 56, at 134-35. Congress, for example, declined to accept an American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) recommendation that superpriority status be afforded to innkeepers' liens; liens
on breeding animals; liens providing for the care, safekeeping and transportation of personal
property; and liens upon animals, vehicles or vessels for the damages they caused, regardless
of whether the lien arose by operation state law or by contract. See Report, supra note 47, at
691, 719-20. Similarly, Congress rejected ABA recommendations to protect landlords' statu-
tory or contractual liens against federal tax liens arising after the lease contract was finalized.'
Creedon, supra note 56, at 135, (citing ABA FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMrFE ON FEDERAL
LIENs, 24-25 (1959)). Thus, in the situations listed above the choateness doctrine remains
applicable, subject only to the notice filing provisions of § 6323(a) and (f). 26 U.S.C. §
6323(a), (f) (1976).
62 Hearings, supra note 58, at 45-47; H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966).
Section 6323 does not refer to the choateness doctrine. The legislative history of the Act,
however, confirms that one of the Act's purposes was to circumscribe the doctrine's applica-
tion. Id.
The priority of federal tax claims enacted in § 6323 is subject to two important excep-
tions. The first is the federal insolvency statute, § 3466, which controls insolvency proceed-
ings. See notes 13 & 58 supra. The second is the Revised Bankruptcy Act. Unsecured federal
tax claims rank sixth in the order of priorities for payment out of the bankrupt estate. 11
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versies over varying interpretations of the choateness doctrine and whether
choateness should be applied at all, have been waged almost exclusively
outside the tax field. 3 Lacking any statutory guidelines or Supreme Court
instruction, the circuit courts fashioned their own rules for applying or
rejecting choateness.' The first point of contention between the circuits
stemmed from a fundamental uncertainty as to which body of law the
courts were to apply. In resolving lien priority disputes, some courts ap-
plied the choateness doctrine of federal common law," other courts at-
tempted to apply federal law as guided by the Model Uniform Commercial
Code," and still other relied upon state procedures. 7
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Kimbell Foods, it was
clear that whether a state lien was sufficiently perfected to defeat a subse-
quently arising or subsequently filed tax lien, was a question of federal
law. 8 Similarly, the character and collection of federal debts and taxes are
U.S.C. § 507 (1976). However, § 545(b) of the Bankruptcy Act limits the trustee's power to
avoid tax liens. 11 U.S.C. § 545(b); S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, repinted in [1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4717, 5799-5801, 5871-72. For a comparison of federal lien
priorities in general and priorities in bankruptcy, see Plumb, supra note 7, at 233-85. See also
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 745-50. But see SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960). The
McClellan Court held that where the Small Business Administration (SBA) had joined a
private bank in making a loan and the borrower filed bankruptcy, the SBA's interest in the
unpaid balance of the loan was entitled to the priority provided for "debts due to the United
States" under Revised Statute § 3466 and § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Id. at 450-52.
The Court reasoned that since the SBA acquired a beneficial interest in the loan prior to the
petition in bankruptcy, it was immaterial that a formal assignment of the note to the SBA
did not occur until after the borrower declared bankruptcy. Id.
13 See, e.g., Willow Creek Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588,
590-91 (7th Cir. 1978) (choateness doctrine applied to deny mechanic's lien priority over
subsequently arising and recorded federal mortgage lien); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred
Village Ass'n, 568 F.2d 217, 218-19, 222 (1st Cir. 1978) (mechanic's lien, not required to be
recorded under state law, held inchoate and denied priority over subsequently arising and
recorded federal agency mortgage); United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678, 688-89, 691-
92 (5th Cir. 1977) (unrecorded mechanic's lien granted priority over subsequently arising FHA
perfected security interest; Uniform Commercial Code, not choateness test, determines fed-
eral lien priorities); United States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687, 688-89
(9th Cir. 1975) (federal deeds of trust denied priority over subsequently accruing local prop-
erty taxes; congressional intent in abolishing choateness doctrine controls); T.H. Rogers
Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14, 20 (10th Cir. 1972) (FHA mortgage entitled to priority over
inchoate materialmen's lien, notwithstanding state law that materialmen's liens relate back
to date on which material was first furnished).
6" Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Ass'n, 568 F.2d 217, 221 (1st Cir. 1978).
65 See text accompanying notes 7-8, supra.
66 See United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678, 679 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1456-57, 1465 (1979): notes 96, 100 infra.
" See Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. Ala. 1968) aff'd per curiam Ault v. United
States, 432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970). Although acknowledging that federal law determines lien
priorities, the Autl court concluded that the Alaska law of lien priorities should be adopted
as the applicable federal rule and rejected "first in time." See also United States v.
California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1975).
" 99 S. Ct. at 1457; United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1963);
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governed by federal law- 9 Before Kimbell Foods, however, the relationship
between state and federal law in lien priority disputes remained uncer-
tain. 0 Indeed, the relationship is still uncertain.
The First,7 Second, 72 Fourth, 73 Seventh,74 and Tenth Circuits 75 have
affirmed the choateness doctrine's continuing viability in nontax, nonin-
solvency proceedings. These circuits held that the 1966 Act abrogates the
choateness doctrine only insofar as federal tax liens are concerned and only
with regard to certain, carefully delineated nonfederal interests.6 These
courts concluded that areas not specifically addressed in the Act are
governed by the choateness doctrine. Moreover, they reasoned that Con-
gress was cognizant of lower federal court decisions applying choateness in
order to grant priority to nontax federal liens and therefore would have
specifically abolished choateness altogether had it intended to do so.7 The
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). The Clearfield Trust Court
observed:
[w]hen the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a
constitutional function or power. . . . The authority [to do so] had its origin in
the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent
on the laws [of any State]. The duties imposed upon the United States and the
rights acquired by it. . . find their roots in the same federal sources. In absence of
an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
rule of law according to their own standards. (Citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 366-67, quoted 99 S. Ct. at 1457.
Go Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267-68 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363i 366-67 (1943).
1* See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Ass'n, 568 F.2d 217, 221 (1st Cir. 1978).
See also note 63 supra.
71 Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Ass'n, 568 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1978).
n United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (antedating federal mortgage lien held superior
to inchoate local real property tax liens).
11 H.B. Agsten & Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust and Sav. Bank, 388 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (circuity of lien priorities case; inchoate mechanic's
liens subordinated to SBA mortgage deed of trust). See J.S. Purcell Lumber Corp. v. Henson,
405 F. Supp. 1130 (E.D. Va. 1975) (subsequently arising and perfected mechanic's lien held
inchoate and subject to FHA recorded deed of trust, contrary state law notwithstanding).
11 Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588
(7th Cir. 1978) (lien held by HUD as a result of assignment of a mortgage entitled to priority
over inchoate mechanics' liens).
15 T.H. Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972) (antedating FHA mort-
gage lien entitled to priority notwithstanding state law that mechanics' and materialmen's
liens relate back to date on which materials or labor were first furnished).
7 See notes 71-75 supra. The Third Circuit has not addressed the question of the continu-
ing viability of the choateness doctrine in nontax situations since the passage of the 1966 Act.
In two decisions prior to the Act, however, the Third Circuit applied the choateness doctrine
to grant priority to SBA mortgage liens. Thus, choateness remained the controlling principle
for resolving nontax lien priority disputes in the Third Circuit prior to the Supreme Court's
Kimbell Foods decision. See United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965);
In re Lehigh Valley Mines, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965).
1 Willow Creek Lumber Co. v. Porter County Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 572 F.2d 588,
590 (7th Cir. 1978); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 568 F.2d 217, 220 n.4
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Circruits which continued to apply the doctrine surmised that Congress is
in a better position than the courts to determine the impact of federal lien
priorities.78 If priorities between competing liens were to be altered, the
legislature, not the courts, should initiate the change."
The Fifth"0 and Ninth Circuits," however, concluded that in light of
congressional disapproval of the choateness doctrine in the tax field, there
was no justification for prolonging the doctrine's existence in areas less
crucial to preservation of the government. These Circuits reasoned that if
Congress had determined to restrict severely the choateness doctrine with
regard to the federal government's role as the "involuntary creditor of the
taxpayer,"" then application of the choateness doctrine to situations where
the federal government voluntarily extends credit is inequitable and un-
necessary." Specifically, these courts have refused to apply the choateness
doctrine to ensure priority for government agencies that operate as com-
mercial lendors or loan guarantors in general commerce.8 1
In sum, the choateness doctrine was formulated by the Supreme Court
to protect federal claims in insolvency proceedings and subsequently ex-
panded by the Court to shelter federal tax liens.8 The Court's erroneous
conclusion that choateness and "first in time" are synonymous, was ac-
cepted by several of the circuit courts, which extended the choateness
doctrine to grant priority to federal mortgages and loans. 6 In 1966, Con-
gress severely circumscribed the doctrine in order to insulate otherwise
"inchoate" interests.87 A number of courts, however, continued to apply
(1st Cir. 1978); T.H. Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14, 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
11 Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 568 F.2d 217, 221 (1st Cir. 1978), citing
United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 470 F.2d 675, 679 (2d Cir.
1972); T.H. Rogers Lumber Co. v. Apel, 468 F.2d 14, 17-20 (10th Cir. 1972); H.B. Agsten &
Sons, Inc. v. Huntington Trust & Say. Bank, 388 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1967).
7' See note 78 supra.
" United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678, 685 (5th Cir. 1977); Kimbell Foods, Inc. v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1977); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Carter, 446 F.2d 136, 139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
"1 United States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1975);
Ault v. United States, 432 F.2d 441, 441 (9th Cir. 170).
82 Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 1977).
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 568 F.2d 217, 221 (1st Cir. 1978); see
Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 500-03 (5th Cir. 1977); Ault v.
Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373, 374-76 (D. Ala. 1968), aff'd sub nom., Ault v. United States, 432
F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970).
8, Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d 687, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
Plumb, The Relative Priority of Federal and Business Claims: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 27 Bus. LAw 1195 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Federal and Business Claims];
Comment, The Relative Priority of SBA Liens: An Unreasonable Extension of Federal
Preference, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SBA Liens].
See text accompanying notes 7, 19-22, 28-29 supra.
'7 See text accompanying notes 34-36, 40, 45-46 supra.
See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
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choateness outside the tax field.8 Against this backdrop, the Supreme
Court agreed to review two Fifth Circuit decisions, Kimbell Foods v. Re-
public National Bank and United States v. Crittenden."
The Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. reiterated
the well-established principle that the priority of liens stemming from
federal lending programs must be determined pursuant to federal law.9'
The Court reasoned, however, that a national rule of priorities to protect
federal loan programs is unnecessary, absent a congressional mandate to
the contrary." Thus, incorporating "nondiscriminatory state laws" to re-
solve lien priority disputes between the federal government and private
lienors will not interfere with federal loan programs.2 The Court specifi-
cally emphasized that the agencies' own operating practices acknowledge
that the federal government's security interests are controlled by the com-
mercial laws of the states. 3 Finally, the Supreme Court determined that
deference to customary commercial practices will not conflict with the
objectives of federal lending programs, since the government as lender is
in essentially the same position as private lenders and does not require the
special protection afforded by the choateness doctrine. 4 Thus, the Court
concluded that the "prudent course" was to adopt the readymade body of
state commercial law as the federal rule of lien priorities until Congress
strikes a different accommodation. 5
In the two decisions which provided a vehicle for the Supreme Court's
rejection of the choateness doctrine in nontax, noninsolvency proceedings,
the Fifth Circuit refused to apply choateness." Rather, the Fifth Circuit
fashioned a federal common law rule based upon the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) .1 In Kimbell, the court was required to determine which
creditor of a merchantile chain was entitled to priority for repayment from
the proceeds of a sale of assets." Under Texas law, Kimbell retained a
"See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
" 99 S. Ct. at 1448.
" 99 S. Ct. at 1457. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1943); see also note 57 supra.
" 99 S. Ct. at 1458-64.
'z Id. at 1465.
"Id. at 1460.
" Id. at 1462-63.
, Id. at 1465.
Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 503 (5th Cir. 1977). Al-
though the Fifth Circuit did not apply Texas law, the court determined that the outcome of
the case would be the same under both Texas law and the UCC. Id. at 497; 99 S. Ct. at 1455.
In United States v. Crittenden, the Fifth Circuit also determined the respective lien priorities
based on the UCC, but declined to consider whether the result would be the same under
Georgia law. 563 F.2d 678, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1977); 99 S. Ct. at 1465. Thus, the Supreme Court,
in deciding that state law was to be applied to resolve lien priority disputes, affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's Kimbell holding, based on Texas law, and vacated the Crittenden decision for
resolution under Georgia law. 99 S. Ct. at 1465.
97 See note 96 supra.
"8 99 S. Ct. at 1453-54; 557 F.2d at 493.
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perfected security interest superior to the bank's subsequently arising
lien.9 As the bank's assignee and guarantor of a private loan to the debtor,
the Small Business Administration (SBA) held an inferior state lien., "
The SBA argued that the federal common law principle of "first in
time, first in right," coupled with the choateness doctrine, entitles federal
claims to priority over all inchoate nonfederal interests. 0' Under those two
common law rules, the SBA lien would have enjoyed priority, because
Kimbell's perfected security interest had not been reduced to a judgment
at the time the SBA recorded its assignment from the bank.10
Similarly, United States v. Crittenden involved the competing priori-
ties between a possessory mechanic's lien and a Farmers Home Adminis-
tration (FHA) security interest.10° The FHA argued that its security inter-
est in the tractor was superior to Crittenden's mechanic's lien, because the
mechanic's lien was inchoate at the time the FHA security interest at-
tached.' 4 In resolving the question of lien priorities, the Fifth Circuit re-
jected state law as well as "first in time" and the choateness doctrine.'5
Rather, the court fashioned a "federal common law rule" based on the
Model Uniform Commercial Code.' The court determined that under this
00 99 S. Ct. at 1453-54; 557 F.2d at 498. See TEx. Bus. & CoM. ConE ANN. § 9.312 (1968).
1w 99 S. Ct. at 1453-54; 557 F.2d at 498. In 1968, O.K. Super Markets borrowed $27,000
from Kimbell Foods, Inc. The supermarket's equipment and merchandise were listed as
collateral in the two security agreements executed between the parties. The two security
agreements also contained standard clauses providing that the collateral would secure any
future advances from Kimbell to O.K. Super Markets. The security agreements were duly
filed in accordance with Texas law. In February 1969, the O.K. Super Markets obtained a
loan from the Republic National Bank. The bank perfected its security interest by filing a
financial statement which listed the same property specified in Kimbell's 1968 agreement.
The bank's loan was guaranteed up to 90% by the SBA. In 1971, Kimbell commenced state
proceedings against O.K. Super Markets to recover its inventory debt. Shortly before Kimbell
filed suit, O.K. Super Markets defaulted on its bank loan. The bank assigned its security
interest to the SBA late in 1970, and the assignment was recorded in January of 1971. In
February of 1971, O.K. Super Markets with the approval of its creditors, sold its equipment
and inventory and placed the proceeds in escrow pending resolution of conflicting claims to
the funds. Kimbell subsequently obtained a judgment against O.K. Super Markets which it
attempted to enforce. 99 S. Ct. at 1453-54. The District Court applied the choateness doctrine
in order to grant the SBA priority over the inchoate Kimbell lien. 401 F. Supp. 316, 321-22
(N.D. Tex. 1975). The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to apply the "peculiar patina" of the
choateness doctrine. 557 F.2d at 498, 499.
,", 99 S. Ct. at 1454, 1454 n.7; 557 F.2d at 498.
0 99 S. Ct. at 1454; 557 F.2d at 449 n.11.
' 99 S. Ct. at 1455-56.
'11 Id.; 563 F.2d at 683-84. The District Court granted siummary judgment in favor of
Crittenden on alternative grounds. According to the district court, the agency had not pro-
perly perfected its security interest because the collateral was inadequately described in the
financing statement. Moreover, even if the description were sufficient, both federal and state
law accorded priority to the mechanic's lien. United States v. Crittenden, Civ. Action No.
75-37-COL (MD Ga. Sept. 25, 1975); 99 S. Ct. at 1456.
10 563 F.2d at 684-88, 685-86 n.13.
,"I Id. at 689.
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rule, Crittenden's lien for the final repair bill of the tractor was entitled to
priority over the FHA security interest.07
Thus, the Supreme Court was confronted with two Fifth Circuit ap-
proaches to the dilemma of federal lien priorities. Both approaches rejected
application of the choateness doctrine;' both acknowledged that federal
law was controlling and declined to base their decisions on state law;111)
both looked to the U.C.C. as the standard for federal common law;" and
both reasoned that federal loan agencies operating in the private sector
should be required to conform to the same commercial practices as private
lenders."' The primary distinction between them was that Kimbell ac-
knowledged the continued viability of "first in time""' whereas Crittenden
rejected it."'
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods never clearly indi-
cated whether "first in time" remains a valid principle in federal common
"7 Id. at 691-92.
' 577 F.2d at 498-502; 563 F.2d at 584-88.
0 557 F.2d at 497-503; 563 F.2d at 681; see note 96 supra.
"o 557 F.2d at 503-04; 563 F.2d at 681-83.
" 557 F.2d at 500; 563 F.2d at 686. See Federal and Business Claims, supra note 84, at
1217; SBA Liens, supra note 84, at 1128-29; Comment, The Priority of Federal Lien Claims:
Selected Problems and Theoretical Considerations, 24 CASE W.L. REv. 521, 534-35 (1973).
l 557 F.2d at 498, 503.
"' 563 F.2d at 683-88. The Crittenden court declined to apply "first in time" which would
have given priority to the government's perfected security interest over the unrecorded me-
chanic's lien. Id. at 685-86 n.13, 685-88. The Fifth Circuit based its decision upon the reason-
ing of its previous rejection of "first in time" in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Carter and the 1966 Act. Id. See Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 446 F.2d 136
(5th Cir. 1971).
In Connecticut Mutal the court held that where an FHA mortgage expressly stated that
it was subject to a mortgage held by the insurance company, the FHA's lien was inferior to
the insurance company's lien for attorney's fees provided for in the first mortgage. 446 F.2d
at 139. The Fifth Circuit did not distinguish between choateness and "first in time." Rather,
the court rejected the choateness doctrine and assumed that "first in time" was inapplicable.
Id. See 563 F.2d at 685-86 n.13. The court determined that the FHA security interest was
subject to the same state rules governing security interests that applied to other lenders. 446
F.2d at 139; 563 F.2d at 685-86 n.13.
Both Connecticut Mutual and Crittenden stressed that the 1966 Act's creation of super-
priority status for certain interests which Congress determined were in need of protection
against federal tax liens, evidenced congressional disapproval of choateness and "first in
time." 446 F.2d at 139; 563 F.2d at 684-86. See note 60 supra. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
in Crittenden noted that the 1966 Act provides that even if notice of a tax lien has been filed,
the tax lien is invalid with respect to a mechanic's lien arising under local law if the mechanic
has been continuously in possession of the property from the time the lien arose. Both the
Crittenden and Connecticut Mutual opinions reasoned that it would be anomalous to allow
the government operating as a lending agency to prevail in a situation where the government
operating as a tax lienor under the Act would have had an inferior interest, subject to the
local lien. 563 F.2d at 686; 446 F.2d at 139-40. According to the Crittenden court, Congress'
narrowing of choateness and "first in time" in the tax field "eliminated the jurisprudential
underpinnings" for applying either common law rule to situations beyond the tax field. 563
F.2d at 687.
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law. Rather, the Court side-stepped the issue. The Fifth Circuit's holding
in Kimbell Foods was affirmed, not because of the Fifth Circuit's applica-
tion of "first in time," but because the Court of Appeals found that Texas
law gave preference to Kimbell's lien."' Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing in Crittenden was vacated and remanded, not because the Court of
Appeals declined to apply "first in time," but because the Fifth Circuit
failed to determine whether the FHA's financing statement was sufficient
under Georgia law and whether Georgia law treats repairman's liens as
superior to previously perfected consensual liens."' The Supreme Court
did not explain, however, whether state law is to be applied in tandem with
"first in time" or whether state law applied as the national rule is to
supersede "first in time."
Instead, the Supreme Court glossed over potential conflicts between
the federal common law of "first in time" and the new federal rule of state
law in lien priority disputes which involve federal loan agencies. The
Court, having determined that federal law controls, stressed that contro-
versies affecting the operation of federal programs do not necessarily re-
quire the application of uniform federal rules."' When there is little need
for a uniform body of federal law, state law may be incorporated as the
federal rule."7
In analyzing whether a uniform federal rule was necessary in resolving
lien priority disputes, the Kimbell Court was required to consider the
extent to which application of a federal rule would upset commercial rela-
tionships predicated on state law."' The government contended that the
effective administration of federal lending programs necessitated a uni-
form federal law of lien priorities. Furthermore, abrogation of "first in
time" and choateness would conflict with the protectionist fiscal policies
"' See 99 S. Ct. at 1465.
5 Id. The applicable Georgia law in Crittenden was far from clear, in part because
Georgia had adopted a commercial code which contains slight aberrations of the UCC. 563
F.2d at 688 n.17. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit feared that state law might discriminate
against federal interests. Id. at 689 n.18.
1 99 S. Ct. at 1458, (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,
594-95 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)). In United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), the Supreme Court determined that "in
many situations where Congress has not acted, the rights, interests and legal relations of the
United States are determined by application of state law." 332 U.S. at 308. United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co. makes it clear, however, that "hostile state rules do not provide
appropriate standards for federal law." 412 U.S. at 595-96.
11 99 S. Ct. at 1458. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in its Kimbell opinion never refers
to the approach to choateness adopted by the Ninth Circuit. In both United States v.
California-Oregon Plywood, Inc. and Ault v. United States, the Ninth Circuit declined to
apply the choateness doctrine and elected instead to apply state law as the applicable federal
rule, the very standard embraced by the Kimbell Court, 527 F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1975);
432 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'g sub nom. Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373, 374-76 (D. Ala.
1968).
"' 99 S. Ct. at 1459.
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underlying those programs."' The Kimbell Court, however, was unper-
suaded. 2'
The Court determined that the application of state law would not
hinder administration of the SBA and FHA loan programs.2 ' The Court
emphasized that SBA employees are instructed to follow state law.'!
Moreover, the SBA Financial Assistance Manual confirms that the SBA
assumes its security interests are governed by each states' respective com-
mercial law.' FHA regulations, observed the Court, also expressly incor-
porate state law. 24 Thus, the Kimbell Court concluded that the agencies'
own operating practices belied their assertions that a uniform federal rule
for resolving priorities was imperative.'2 The Court also emphasized that
loan applications receive individual scrutiny. The Court reasoned that the
agencies could readily tailor loan transactions to conform to state priority
rules, just as the agencies evaluate other factual and legal considerations
before dispensing federal funds.'
2
1
The government further contended that the application of local law
would hinder the agencies' ability to recover disbursed funds and therefore
would undermine the programs' objectives.2 7 The government argued that
money received in the collection of taxes was not materially different from
money received in the repayment of federal loans. Therefore, the 1966
Federal Tax Lien Act, which allows for the continuing application of
choateness and "first in time" to interests not expressly provided for under
the Act, should apply by analogy to the collection of federal loans. '2 Since
Congress did not abolish either choateness or "first in time," the govern-
ment inferred that Congress implicitly approved the doctrines' application
to federal loans.'
2 9
The Kimbell Court determined otherwise. The Court stressed that the
government acting as a tax collector operates in an essentially involuntary
119 Id.
"2 Id.
1 Id. The Court cited with approval its rejection of a similar argument advanced by the
government in United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966). In Yazell, the Court dis-
missed arguments that a need for uniformity superceded application of state coveture rules
to an SBA loan contract. 382 U.S. at 353-57. The Court reasoned that SBA operations were
specifically adapted to state law and that the federal interest in uniformity was minimal. Id.
at 353-54.
"2 99 S. Ct. at 1459. See 13 C.F.R. § 101(d)(3) (1978); SBA FinancialAssistance Manual,
SOP 50-10, ch. 6 § 29-2(4)(b) (1978).
'2 See note 122 supra.
"14 99 S. Ct. at 1460 n.27. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 5504, 7978, 23986, 55882-55895, 56643-
56647, 59078 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 170, 4431-4458, 6354, 10979-10980 (1979).
" 99 S. Ct. at 1460.
'H Id.
In Id. As noted above, the 1966 Act did not completely abolish the choateness doctrine
in the tax field. It severally circumscribed the doctrine, however, and called into question the
continuing viability of choateness in noninsolvency situations. See notes 61, 62 supra.
'u 99 S. Ct. at 1461.
"' Id.
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capacity, whereas the government serving as a money lender is able to
invoke protective measures against defaulting debtors.3 " Moreover, SBA
and FHA lending programs are a form of social welfare legislation designed
to assist individuals who are unable to obtain funds from private lenders.
The Court surmised that had the Congress intended the private commer-
cial sector to bear the risks of default entailed by these public welfare
programs, it would have created a priority scheme superseding state law.
Both Congress and the agencies, however, have expressly acknowledged
the priority of certain private liens over federal security interests.3' To the
Kimbell Court, this acknowledgement indicated that the extraordinary
safeguards of the choateness doctrine were unnecessary to protect federal
lending programs. 2
The Court pointed to the 1966 Act as additional evidence that placing
the federal government on the same footing with other commercial lenders
would not undermine the government's interests.3 3 To ignore Congress'
express disapproval of unrestricted federal priority in such a vital area as
revenue collection would be inconsistent with the Court's responsibility to
effectuate congressional policy.
34
Finally, the Supreme Court stressed that the business community relies
on state commercial law in order to make reasonable evaluations of the
risks involved in financial transactions. Thus, the "prudent course" se-
lected by the Court was to adopt "nondiscriminatory state laws" as the
standard for determining the priority of private and consensual liens aris-
ing pursuant to federal lending programs.'
35
Underlying the Supreme Court's adoption of state commercial law is
the assumption that commercial rules of law are, and will continue to be,
fairly uniform throughout the nation.' 31 Indeed, the Court noted that all
of the states except Louisiana have adopted the U.C.C. with minor
variations, and "[tihe differences between the [U.C.C.] rules . . . are
insignificant in comparison with the similarities." 37 The importance of the
13 Id. at 1362.
13, Id. See notes 60, 61 supra. A significant indicium of congressional intent not men-
tioned in the Kimbell opinion is § 646 of the Small Business Act. 15 U.S.C. § 631-47 (1976).
In § 646, Congress subordinated certain SBA liens to local property tax liens, thus ensuring
the priority of the local lien. See United States v. California-Oregon Plywood, Inc., 527 F.2d
687, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1975).
132 99 S. Ct. at 1462, 1463.
' Id. at 1464. In enacting the 1966 Act, Congress sought to "improv[eJ the status of
private secured creditors" and prevent interference with commercial financing by
"moderniz[ing] . . . the relationship of Federal tax liens to the interests of other creditors."
Id. at 1463-64, quoting S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1966), reprinted in 11966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3722.
'" 99 S. Ct. at 1464, (citing Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S.
204, 209-10 (1946)).
99 S. Ct. at 1464-65.
130 See 99 S. Ct. at 1460 n.28, 1462 n.37.
, Id. at 1460 n.28. The Court's emphasis on uniformity in the Uniform Commercial
Code is also somewhat misleading. Interpretations of the UCC vary from state to state. More
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Court's reliance upon a generally uniform pattern of state commercial law
stems from the fact that the Court elected to apply "non-discriminatory"
state law. State commercial law based upon the U.C.C. clearly satisfied
the Kimbell Court's criterion of being non-discriminatory.' Indeed, the
priority rules established in Article 9 ofthe UCC are premised upon the
general principle that "[c]onflicting security interests rank according to
priority in time of filing or perfection," with several carefully delineated
exceptions.' 9
Article 9, however, does not cover all varieties of secured transactions
and defers to additional state law with regard to certain types of property
of numerous local liens. " ' One area of law particularly beset with "local
eccentricities" is the priority of material and mechanic's liens."' Depend-
ing upon the state, a subcontractor's lien for wages and materials may arise
when he begins work, when the general contractor commences work, or
when the subcontractor enters into the contract. Indeed, the lienor may be
entitled to superpriority over a mortgage lienor regardless of whether the
mortgage was recorded or the subcontractor's contract was executed."
2
The Supreme Court's opinion in Kimbell Foods sheds no light on
whether any or all of these state law provisions for protecting the mechanic
or materialmen are "discriminatory." Perhaps if a state statute favors a
particular class of lienors over all antedating or subsequent liens, the Court
would consider the statute fair.' Perhaps too, local statutes which estab-
lish an order of priority between conflicting liens are discriminatory insofar
as they favor certain interests over others.' 4 The Court's failure to provide
significantly, however, the UCC itself varies from one jurisdiction to another and variances
between state commercial codes appears to be increasing. See Minahan, The Eroding Uni-
formity of ihe Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Ky. L.J. 799, 810-11 (1977). Article 9 was
amended significantly in 1972, and only about one third of the states have adopted the 1972
amendments. Id. at 810. Minahan explains that there are basically three ways in which state
legislatures have defeated efforts to achieve uniformity in the UCC. First, the official text
has been amended too freely. Second, many significant amendments recommended by the
UCC's Permanent Editorial Board hay not been enacted. Additional state legislation, which
varies or supercedes UCC provisions has also been promulgated. Id. at 807. Cf. Coogan,
Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012, 1053-54 (1978) (Article 9 is
largely uniform throughout the states).
'' See 99 S. Ct. at 1460 n.28.
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1972 version).
14 See id. § 9-104 (1972 version).
' Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d 217, 222 n.7 (1st Cir. 1978),
citing Plumb, supra note 7, at 677.
UZ See note 141 supra.
"' In Virginia, for example, perfected mechanics' and materialmen's liens are superior
to any subsequently perfected liens on the property. VA. CODE § 43-3 (1950). In order for a
general contractor to perfect his lien, he must file notice of his lien at any time after the work
is completed and within ninety days after the project is finished. VA. CODE § 43-4 (1979
Supp.). If the lien is filed within the period required by the statute, the lien is secured from
the time the material or labor was furnished, subject to being defeated by prior or intervening
supply liens. See In re West Norfolk Lumber Co., 112 F. 759, 766 (E.D. Va. 1902).
" See GA. CODE § 67-2002 (1979 Supp.). The Georgia Code provides that mechanics' and
1222 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI
a lucid definition of the "variety of considerations always relevant to the
nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them
of applying state law"'45 leaves the question of lien priorities open to in-
creased judicial scrutiny.
For all of their inequities, the choateness doctrine and "first in time
rule" as applied to federal loan agency liens did provide a means of insur-
ing the priority of federal interests where arguably "discriminatory" state
law provided otherwise. 4' Moreover, recent history, particularly in bank-
ruptcy law, strongly suggests that regardless of the Kimbell Court's man-
date that state law should determine lien priorities, the federal courts are
unlikely to abandon federal interests to the judgments of state legislatures
when state law in any way hinders federal agency programs.'47
Finally, the underlying problem with the Kimbell Court's decision may
well be that what is needed, is a legislative rather than judicial solution.
The Court's deference to "non-discriminatory state law" merely sets the
stage for subsequent litigation as to the merits and shortcomings of various
local statutes. Only the Congress can provide a series of specific guidelines,
based upon carefully formulated policy considerations, for determining
priorities between competing liens. The perfect model for resolving this
controversy is the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, which clearly sets forth an
equitable list of guidelines for determining priorities.' The Supreme
Court in its efforts to remedy the uncertainties created by the choateness
doctrine, has created a potential quagmire which only legislative action
can eradicate.
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materialmen's liens are inferior to liens for taxes, laborers' liens, landlords' liens when a
distress warrant for rent has been levied, certain purchase money claims, and certain other
general liens when "actual" notice has been communicated before the work was done or
materials furnished. A literal reading of § 67-2002 would deny priority to a lien for federal
loan money which had been duly recorded but where no actual notice had been communi-
cated to the mechanics or materialmen.
" 99 S. Ct. at 1458, (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310
(1947)).
"I See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 568 F.2d 217, 221-22 (1st Cir.
1978).
"I See Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 407, 635-36, 642 (1972). Countryman argues persuasively that courts have repeatedly
"molded" state law to effectuate what they believe is the federal policy underlying bank-
rutpcy law.
"I See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
